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children ages sixteen and seventeen in its custodial interference
statutes, which leaves this group of children unprotected. It is im-
portant to note that, consistent with the Hague Convention, New
York has adopted the definition of a child as a human being under
the age of sixteen. If the United States ratifies the CRC, New York
will have to address the disparity between the CRC’s definition of a
child and New York’s definition under its Penal Laws. Even though
New York has preventative and educational methods available to
combat child abductions, the State should concentrate more re-
sources into the specific crime of international parental abduction.
More awareness of this issue would be appropriate and helpful for
New York and its children under the age of eighteen.
Section Two: Article 6 of the CRC and
New York State Law
by Chantima Chokloikaew86
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right
to life.
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible
the survival and development of the child.87
The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) was
adopted by a unanimous vote of the United Nations General As-
sembly.88 States Parties to the CRC undertake to submit reports on
the implementation of the CRC to the United Nations Committee
on the Rights of the Child (“U.N. Committee”).89 These reports
provide information on the measures adopted by States Parties to
give effect to the rights set forth in the CRC and indicate progress
and difficulties that may affect the degree of fulfillment of State
Party obligations under the CRC.90 The purpose of these reports is
to provide the U.N. Committee with a comprehensive understand-
ing of the implementation of the CRC by the State Party con-
cerned. This Section attempts to simulate such a report under New
York State law. Accordingly, this Section outlines different areas of
86  J.D. Candidate, Albany Law School; B.A., New York University.
87 CRC, supra note 2, art. 6(2).
88 See id.
89 RACHEL HODGKIN & PETER NEWELL, IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK FOR THE CON-
VENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 604 (UNICEF 1998) [hereinafter UNICEF IM-
PLEMENTATION HANDBOOK].
90 Id.
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New York State law concerning the child, and compares these laws
with the general principle set forth in Article 6 of the CRC—the
right to life.
I. ARTICLE 6
The fundamental right to life is seen as a universal right under
United States and international law.91 The CRC designation of the
right to life in Article 6 is exceptional in its requirement for States
Parties to ensure the “survival and development of the child.”92
This provision raises the State’s obligation from one of withholding
arbitrary deprivation of life93 to one of actively providing and pro-
tecting the child “to the maximum extent possible” to ensure sur-
vival and development.94 This essentially turns the State’s
obligation toward the child from a negative to a positive right. For
example, under the CRC, a child’s right to health services requires
not only that States Parties ensure that a child is not deprived of
the right to access health care services but, also, inter alia, that the
State Party develop preventative health care systems95 and take ap-
propriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality.96
There is a link connecting a child’s right to life with health
rights under the CRC.97 The U.N. Committee further stresses the
holistic connection98 between health rights and the right to an ade-
quate standard of living99 and to education.100 Article 24 of the
CRC illustrates this interdependency by requiring that “in particu-
lar[,] parents and children are informed, have access to education
and are supported in the use of basic knowledge of child health
and nutrition, the advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and envi-
ronmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents.”101 This
shows the link between health and basic education as rights under
the CRC. Education also ties in with positive child development.102
Article 29 of the CRC sets forth the aims of education. The first aim
91 See generally U.S. CONST pmbl.; United Nations Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
92 CRC, supra note 2, art. 6(2).
93 Id. art. 6(1).
94 Id. art. 6(2).
95 Id. art. 24(2)(f).
96 Id. art. 24(2)(a).
97 Id. art. 24.
98  UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 317.
99 CRC, supra note 2, art. 27.
100 Id. art. 28.
101 Id. art. 24(2)(e).
102 Id. art. 29.
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of education is “the development of the child’s personality, talents
and mental and physical abilities to their fullest potential.”103 This
aim illustrates the general principle that development under the
CRC encompasses physical, mental, spiritual, moral, psychological,
and social development,104 all in preparation for adulthood.
Unlike the CRC, which views survival and development holisti-
cally, New York law seems to reflect a dichotomy between survival
and development. There are numerous provisions in New York law
that address survival, meaning that there are laws serving to pre-
serve and protect a child’s life. In comparison, provisions in New
York law addressing a child’s development are underdeveloped.
In this Section, I will compare the legal principles of New York
law that correlate to the right to life and survival and development
principles under the CRC. This includes capital punishment, mili-
tary enlistment, healthcare, education, employment, social services,
and care for especially vulnerable children.105
II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The CRC has a clear position on capital punishment.106 Article
37(a) of the CRC prohibits capital punishment “for offences com-
mitted by persons below eighteen years of age.”107 Article 6 of the
CRC reinforces this by recognizing every child’s inherent right to
life.108 The U.N. Committee emphasizes the importance of this
right by further stressing that it is not enough that the death pen-
alty is not applied to children; the prohibition of the application of
the death penalty in regards to children must be confirmed in
legislation.109
New York law allows the death penalty for the crime of murder
in the first degree;110 however, a recent New York State Court of
Appeals decision held the death penalty statute to be unconstitu-
tional for reasons unrelated to children.111 Since then, the New
York Legislature has unsuccessfully sought to reintroduce the
death penalty in a way that would remedy the issues found in People
103 Id.
104 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 86.
105 See infra Sections II–IX.
106 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 89.
107 CRC, supra note 2, art. 37(a).
108 Id. art. 6.
109 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 89.
110 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 2006); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06,
§ 70.00 (McKinney 2006).
111 People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88, 99 (2004); see People v. Taylor, 9 N.Y.3d 129
(2007).
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v. LaValle, which primarily concerned the deadlock jury instruction
provisions in the death penalty statute.112 However, these legislative
attempts to reintroduce the death penalty have been without suc-
cess. It should be noted that two of the bills—Assembly Bill 2210113
and Assembly Bill 2209114—proposing to reintroduce the death
penalty address the issue of child victims. Assembly Bill 2210 at-
tempted to reinstate the death penalty for the killing of a disabled
person, including a person deemed disabled because of age.115 As-
sembly Bill 2209 attempted to reinstate the death penalty for do-
mestic violence-based killings, including those involving minor
victims.116 Notwithstanding these attempts, no child, as defined by
the CRC, would be affected in the event of a successful reintroduc-
tion of the death penalty in New York because of a 2004 U.S. Su-
preme Court decision that held that it is unconstitutional to
impose a capital sentence on defendants who committed crimes
when under the age of eighteen.117
The U.N. Committee would approve of the current status of
the death penalty law in New York, but would probably urge that
legislation be changed to reflect the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Roper v. Simmons, which is more in line with the principles of the
CRC.
III. JUVENILE JUSTICE
Generally, New York law provides that a person under the age
of sixteen years old is not “criminally responsible for conduct.”118
New York law defines a juvenile delinquent as a person over seven
and under sixteen years old who has committed a misdemeanor or
a felony crime.119 The term “juvenile offender”120 is to be distin-
guished from the term “juvenile delinquent,” which applies to a
youth subject to proceedings in family court.121 Juvenile delin-
quents are prosecuted in family court rather than criminal






117 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
118 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(1).
119 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1) (McKinney 2006).
120 A juvenile offender is defined as a youth who is thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen
and has committed a more serious or violent offense specified in the Penal Law, and
thus may be prosecuted as an adult in Supreme Court. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(18).
121 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 301.2(1).
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court.122
The exceptions to this general practice are numerous.123 A
child age thirteen or older may be designated a juvenile offender
and prosecuted as an adult for certain serious crimes.124 The spe-
cific crimes for which a child age thirteen is criminally responsible
are the act of murder in the second degree,125 or a “sexually moti-
vated felony.”126 A “sexually motivated felony” is defined as com-
mitment of “a specified offense127 for the purpose, in whole or
substantial part, of his or her own direct sexual gratification.”128
The sexually motivated felony “shall be deemed to be the same
offense level as the specified offense the defendant committed.”129
If convicted of “intentional” or “depraved” murder in the second
degree, a child as young as thirteen may receive the maximum of
an indeterminate prison term of life and a minimum period of im-
prisonment of seven and a half years.130 The indeterminate sen-
tence of imprisonment for juvenile offenders is mandatory.131 A
person as young as fourteen can be criminally responsible for vio-
lent crimes such as aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree, ar-
son in the first and second degrees, assault in the first degree,
attempted kidnapping in the first degree, kidnapping in the first
degree, attempted murder in the second degree, burglary in the
first and second degrees, criminal possession of weapons on school
grounds, criminal sexual act in the first degree, manslaughter in
the first degree, rape in the first degree, or robbery in the first and
122 Id.
123 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(2).
124 Id.
125 Id. §§ 30.00(2), 125.25(1).
126 Id. § 130.91.
127 The specified offenses are as follows: Assault in the first and second degrees, id.
§§ 120.10, 120.05; Gang assault in the first and second degrees, id. §§ 120.07, 120.06;
Stalking in the first degree, id. § 120.60; Manslaughter in the first and second degrees,
id. §§ 125.20, 125.15(1); Aggravated murder, id. § 125.26; Murder in the first and
second degrees, id. §§ 125.27, 125.25; Kidnapping in the first and second degrees, id.
§§ 135.25, 135.20; Burglary in the first, second, and third degrees, id. §§ 140.30,
140.25, 140.20; Arson in the first and second degrees, id. §§ 150.20, 150.15; Robbery
in the first, second, and third degrees, id. §§ 160.15, 160.10, 160.05; Promoting prosti-
tution in the first and second degrees, id. §§ 230.32, 230.30; Compelling prostitution,
id. § 230.33; Disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree, id.
§ 235.22; Use of a child in a sexual performance, id. § 263.05; Promoting an obscene
sexual performance by a child, id. § 263.10; Promoting a sexual performance by a
child, id. § 263.15. Finally, any conspiracy and felony attempts to commit any of the
foregoing crimes is also included as a specified offense. Id. § 130.91.
128 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.91(1).
129 Id. § 130.92(2).
130 Id. § 70.05.
131 Id. § 70.05(1).
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second degrees.132 The fact that a child can still be held criminally
responsible and possibly receive a sentence of life imprisonment
cannot be construed as an active attempt to ensure “the survival
and development of the child . . . [to the] maximum extent possi-
ble,” as required by Article 6 of the CRC.133
Under New York law, a child can avoid a criminal conviction if
adjudicated a “youthful offender,”134 which allows a judge leniency
to avoid imposing a sentence of imprisonment135 since the adjudi-
cation is not deemed a conviction of a crime or any other of-
fense.136 The court may find that an eligible youth is a youthful
offender if, in the opinion of the court, the interest of justice
would be served by relieving the eligible youth from the onus of a
criminal record and by not imposing an indeterminate term of im-
prisonment of more than four years.137 Youthful offender eligibility
is based on the nature of the crime and a youth’s prior record.138
However, there are many hurdles to eligibility for youthful of-
fender status. First, the person may be a thirteen, fourteen, or fif-
teen-year old prosecuted in criminal court as a juvenile offender,
or a sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen-year old youth at the time of
commission of the crime.139 Moreover, youthful offender status is
available for any crime except for a class A felony or armed felony,
rape in the first degree, a criminal sexual act in the first degree, or
aggravated sexual abuse.140 A youth is not eligible for youthful of-
fender status if she or he has any previous felony convictions or
sentences, a youthful offender adjudication following a conviction
of a felony, or a previous juvenile delinquency adjudication for the
132 Id. § 30.00(2).
133 CRC, supra note 2, art. 6(2).
134 Youthful offenders include juvenile offenders or youths who are at least sixteen
and less than nineteen when the crime was committed whose conviction was set aside
by a judge and replaced with non-criminal adjudication. Thus, a sixteen-year old is
not a juvenile offender, but may be eligible for youthful offender status. Both of-
fender labels are different from “juvenile delinquent,” who is a youth between the
ages of seven and fifteen who commits an act which would be a crime if she or he
were an adult, but the crime is considered a “delinquent act” due to the child’s youth.
A youth adjudicated a juvenile delinquent by the family court is provided with treat-
ment or confinement, with the goal of rehabilitation. ERIC WARNER, THE JUVENILE
OFFENDER HANDBOOK, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, available at
www.nyc.gov/html/djj/html/cases.html.
135 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.10(1).
136 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 720.20.
137 Id. § 720.20(1)(a).
138 WARNER, supra note 134.
139 N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW § 720.10.
140 Id. § 720.10(2)(a).
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commission of a “designated felony act.”141
These numerous exceptions to youthful offender eligibility
make it more likely that a child will not be eligible for the discre-
tionary leniency provided for in New York law. If a child fifteen-
years old or younger is convicted as a juvenile offender, the only
available safeguard to the incarcerated minor is that she or he can-
not be incarcerated in the same facility as adults.142 However, not-
withstanding this safeguard against the potential assault and sexual
abuse by adult inmates, New York laws concerning juvenile justice
do not seem to be in line with the general principle of right to life,
survival, and development under Article 6 of the CRC. Indeed,
studies have shown that once a child enters the juvenile justice sys-
tem, he or she rarely leaves its revolving doors.143
One of the major pipelines into the juvenile justice system is
the status offense144 of truancy. In New York State, there is no defi-
nition of truancy except for the vague definition of a child being
“unlawfully absent from attendance upon instruction.”145 This lack
of a clear definition for truancy leaves children vulnerable to de-
tention as a truant for missing just one day of school. Should the
child be habitually truant or “incorrigible,” she or he can be
deemed a school delinquent and may be required to have a Person
In Need of Supervision (“PINS”)146 Proceeding in family court. In
2007, as a result of the New York City Police Department’s Truancy
Sweep Program, there were several documented incidents of ques-
tionable detention, arrest, and court involvement for children who
were deemed truants when, in fact, they were late and on their way
to school.147
141 Id. § 720.10(2)(b)–(c).
142 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 304.1(2).
143  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, MANUAL TO COMBAT TRUANCY, available at
http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/Truancy; VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, APPROACHES TO TRU-
ANCY PREVENTION, http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/197_377.pdf; OFFICE OF JU-
VENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, TRUANCY: FIRST STEP TO A LIFETIME OF
PROBLEMS, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/truncy.txt.
144 A status offense is an act that is a crime due to the young age of the actor, but
would not be illegal for someone older. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 711–718.
145 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3213(2)(a).
146 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(a) (defining a “person in need of supervision” as a
person who is less than eighteen years of age who does not attend school or who is
incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of
a parent or other person legally responsible for such child’s care, or other lawful
authority, or who violates the provisions of section 221.05 of the penal law (unlawful
possession of marihuana)).
147 Letter from Donna Liberman, Executive Director of New York Civil Liberties
Union, to William C. Thompson Jr., President of New York City Board of Education
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While there are many education-related studies that empha-
size the importance of addressing truancy and that claim that tru-
ancy is linked to future delinquency,148 there is a noticeable lack of
studies that address the possibility that truancy is the gateway to the
juvenile justice system and creates future delinquents.
Apart from truancy, the other most common status offenses
among children in New York State are running away from home,
alcohol use, curfew violations, and ungovernability.149 Individual
towns have the authority to enact curfew laws so long as that law
bears a substantial relationship to an important governmental ob-
jective.150 The CRC views status offenses as discriminatory and
harmful to children. The fact that status offenses often lead the
child into the revolving doors of family court151 would raise major
concerns for the U.N. Committee. Article 37(b) of the CRC states
that any arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child must not only
be in conformity with the law, but must also be used only as a mea-
sure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of
time.152 This is related to the child’s right to mental and social de-
velopment in Article 6 of the CRC.153 The sentencing laws of New
York State are of some concern, but more research and informa-
tion would be needed to ascertain whether these sentencing laws
are measures of last resort and the shortest appropriate periods of
time.
IV. MILITARY ENLISTMENT
As the CRC is indivisible and its articles interdependent,154
when considering the issue of military enlistment—which goes to
and Harold O. Levy, Interim Chancellor of New York City Board of Education (May
23, 2007), available at http://www.nyclu.org/node/567.
148  See MYRIAM L. BAKER, JANE NADY SIGMON & M. ELAINE NUGENT, TRUANCY REDUC-
TION: KEEPING STUDENTS IN SCHOOL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf
files1/ojjdp/188947.pdf.
149 ACT 4 JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE STATUS OFFENSES FACT SHEET, www.act4jj.org/
media/factsheets/factsheet_17.pdf.
150 “A town may enact a juvenile curfew law pursuant to its home rule police powers
if it proves that the provision bears a substantial relationship to an important govern-
mental objective, but it may not charge parents with a violation, punishable by fine
and/or imprisonment, if their minor children violate the curfew.” See 2005 Informal
Op. N.Y. Att’y Gen. 13 (2005), http://www.ag.ny.gov/bureaus/appeals_opinions/
opinions/2005/informal/2005_13.pdf.
151  MANUAL TO COMBAT TRUANCY, supra note 143.
152 CRC, supra note 2, art. 37.
153 Id. art. 6.
154  UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 17.
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the heart of the inherent right to life principle under Article 6—it
is necessary to also look at Article 38 of the CRC, which discusses
the protection of children who are affected by armed conflict.155
Article 38 requires States Parties to take all feasible measures to
ensure that children under fifteen years of age do not directly par-
ticipate in armed conflict,156 such as refraining from recruiting
youths under fifteen into armed forces,157 and giving priority to the
oldest youth when recruiting anyone who is between fifteen and
eighteen years old.158 This particular article’s age provisions are an
anomaly in the CRC because Article 1 of the CRC defines the age
of majority as eighteen.159 In response to this incongruity, the Op-
tional Protocol to the CRC raised the minimum age for involve-
ment in hostilities and recruitment into armed forces to eighteen
years old160 in “light of the definition of the child and the principle
of the best interests of the child.”161
New York’s military enlistment qualifications are tied to fed-
eral law.162 These qualifications comport with the CRC’s require-
ment that military enlistment must be of persons at least fifteen
years old by only accepting original enlistment of “qualified, effec-
tive, and able-bodied persons who are not less than seventeen years
nor more than forty-two years of age.”163 The relevant federal stat-
ute also seems to provide a safeguard for minors by specifically re-
quiring the written consent of a parent or guardian of a person
under age eighteen if “he has a parent or guardian entitled to his
custody and control.”164 This statute suggests that federal and New
York State law recognize and acknowledge that a person under age
eighteen is a minor and generally requires protection from military
involvement. It can be argued, however, that the provision in the
law requiring a parent or guardian’s consent to a minor’s enlist-
ment makes this safeguard inapplicable to those persons under
eighteen who have no legal guardian or are emancipated.
155 CRC, supra note 2, art. 38.
156 Id. art. 38(2).
157 Id. art. 38(3).
158 Id.
159 Id. art. 1.
160 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involve-
ment of Children in Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 54/263, art. 1–4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
54/263 (May 25, 2000) [hereinafter Optional Protocol for Children in Armed
Conflict].
161 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 511.
162 N.Y. MIL. LAW. § 90(1) (McKinney 2006).
163 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2008).
164 Id.
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Article 6 requires States Parties to take positive measures to
protect life and not merely to construe the “inherent right to life”
in a restrictive manner.165 This understanding, combined with the
general definition of the child as “below the age of eighteen,”166
raises concerns regarding the federal and New York State provi-
sions allowing for seventeen-year olds to be enlisted. Allowing
youth under eighteen-years old to be enlisted is a contravention of
Article 6 of the CRC.
V. ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE CHILDREN
A. Refugees
There are only two provisions in New York law that are related
to refugee status and Article 6 of the CRC’s inherent right to life.
The two provisions concern educational grants167 and loans for ref-
ugees and federal public assistance.168 New York law regarding ref-
ugees’ access to educational loans and grants puts refugees on
equal footing with U.S. citizens for the purpose of loan and grant
eligibility, thereby removing the distinction between children
based on their citizenship status.
The federal public assistance statutes authorize the operation
of “a Cuban and Haitian entrant program and a refugee resettle-
ment program pursuant to [T]itle IV of the federal [I]mmigration
and [N]ationality [A]ct, including provision for refugee cash assis-
tance, refugee medical assistance, refugee child welfare services,
and refugee social services.”169 This provision allows for a broad
array of services that are necessary to ensure a child’s survival, such
as medical assistance and welfare services.
B. Commercial Sexual Exploitation
Definitions in New York Penal Law of sex trafficking and pros-
titution do not stipulate age, and nor do they explicitly mention
children.170 As such, it is possible for a child to be charged with
prostitution while under the age of sexual consent.171 However,
during the 2005 session, the New York State Legislature attempted
to address the increase in the number of children forced into “sex
165 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 87.
166 CRC, supra note 2, art. 1.
167 N.Y. EDUC. LAW. § 661.
168 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 358 (McKinney 2006).
169 Id. § 358(3).
170 See N.Y. PENAL LAW. §§ 130.00, 230.00.
171 See id. §§ 230.00, 130.05(3)(a).
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slavery” by creating the new offense of “compelling prostitu-
tion.”172 This offense punishes a person for a class B felony when,
“being twenty-one years of age or older, he or she knowingly ad-
vances prostitution by compelling a person less than sixteen years
old, by force or intimidation, to engage in prostitution.”173 Other
attempts to protect children from commercial sexual exploitation
are the various provisions prohibiting the promotion of sexual per-
formances by children and possession of child pornography.174
New York’s Social Services Law provides that the Office of
Temporary and Disability Assistance (“OTDA”) give specific ser-
vices to victims of human trafficking.175 These services include:
case management, emergency temporary housing, healthcare,
mental health counseling, drug addiction screening and treat-
ment, language interpretation and translation services, English
language instruction, job training and placement assistance,
post-employment services for job retention, and services to assist
the individual and any of his or her family members to establish
a permanent residences in New York state or the United
States.176
Although there is no mention of children per se in these services,
there is a special provision concerning victims under the age of
eighteen.177 Where the victim is under the age of eighteen, OTDA
is required to notify the local Department of Social Services in the
area where the child was found.178
C. Street Children
The New York State Legislature has recognized that runaway
youths are without protection and are exposed to unnecessary dan-
ger. Accordingly, the Legislature enacted the Runaway and Home-
less Youth Act to establish procedures and services to protect
runaway youth and to alleviate the personal or family situation that
may present a threat to the health and safety of the youth.179
The statute defines a “runaway youth” as a “person under the
age of eighteen years who is absent from his legal residence with-
out the consent of his parent, legal guardian or custodian.”180 A
172 Id. § 230.33.
173 Id.
174 Id. §§ 263.00 et seq.
175 See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 483-bb(a).
176 Id. § 483-bb(b).
177 See id. § 483-cc(b).
178 Id.
179 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 532.
180 Id. § 532-a(1).
498 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:473
“homeless youth” is defined as “a person under the age of twenty-
one who is in need of services and is without a place of shelter
where supervision and care are available.”181
Runaway programs have been established and are authorized
to provide a variety of services to runaway and homeless youth.
These services include:
(a) provide assistance . . . ; (b) attempt to determine the cause
for the youth’s runaway or homeless status; (c) explain to the
runaway and homeless youth his legal rights and options of ser-
vice or other assistance available to the youth; (d) work towards
reuniting such youth with his parent or guardian as soon as
practicable . . . ; (e) assist in arranging for necessary services for
runaway or homeless youth, and where appropriate, their fami-
lies, including but not limited to food, shelter, clothing, medical
care, education and individual and family counseling.182
Moreover, there is a statewide central register and clearinghouse
for missing children.183 These provisions indicate the New York
State Legislature’s attempt to protect a child’s right to life and,
more importantly, an attempt to ensure the survival and develop-
ment of street children,184 an especially vulnerable group.
In further ensuring child development, the New York Educa-
tion Law also provides that homeless children between ages of five
and twenty-one who have not obtained a high school diploma are
entitled to attend a public school.185 Homeless children are also
entitled to free transportation to school.186 For the purposes of the
Education Law, a homeless youth is defined as a child who “lacks a
fixed, regular, and adequate night-time residence”187 or whose pri-
mary nighttime residence is a shelter or “a public or private place
not designed for, or ordinarily used as, a regular sleeping accom-
modation for human beings.”188
One possible problem with the compulsory education law,
which was intended to be a child protective statute ensuring every
child receives adequate educational opportunities,189 is the issue of
truancy arrests.190 “A supervisor of attendance, attendance teacher
181 Id. § 532-a(2).
182 Id. § 532-b(1).
183 Id. § 837-e.
184 Id. § 532.
185 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202(1).
186 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 62(6)(c).
187 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3209(1)(a)(1).
188 Id. § 3209(1)(a)(2)(ii).
189 See Matter of Julio R., 129 Misc.2d 171 (1985).
190 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3213(2)(a).
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or attendance officer” is given authority to “arrest without warrant
any minor who is unlawfully absent from attendance upon instruc-
tion.”191 The unstable and unpredictable nature of being homeless
makes such children more susceptible to being labeled a truant
and arrested. Also, a person less than eighteen years old who does
not attend school in accordance to the attendance requirements of
compulsory education may be deemed a PINS.192
Another possible problem that might arise for homeless chil-
dren is that, under the New York Penal Law, loitering is a misde-
meanor and is defined as “remain[ing] or wander[ing] about in a
public place for the purpose of begging” or “remain[ing] in any
transportation facility, or is found sleeping therein, and is unable
to give a satisfactory explanation of his presence.”193 These are acts
that most homeless youth and adults alike tend to default to, due
to the nature of their status. It seems then that under the Penal
Law homeless children are punished for being homeless. However,
this effect has been mitigated as the subdivision of this statute con-
cerning begging has been recognized by New York courts as un-
constitutional on First Amendment grounds in 1993.194
Overall, New York’s laws regarding vulnerable children are in
accord with the CRC’s requirements of state promotion of survival
and development for children. However, in several key areas New
York State laws fail to fully reflect the requirements of Article 6.
VI. HEALTHCARE
New York Public Health Law provides for health services that
will “promote public health and prevent illness.”195 Among these
services are “activities designed to reduce perinatal, infant and ma-
ternal mortality and morbidity and to promote the health of in-
fants, children, adolescents, and people of childbearing age.”196
The Public Health Law specifies that such activities will include
“family centered perinatal care and other services appropriate to
promote the birth of a healthy baby to a healthy mother, and ser-
vices to prevent and detect health problems in infants, young chil-
dren, and school age children.”197 There is an active effort to
191 Id.
192 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(a) .
193 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.35(1), 240.35(7).
194 See Loper v. New York City Police Department, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
195 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 602(2)(a) (McKinney 2006).
196 Id. § 602(3)(b)(1).
197 Id.
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diminish infant and child mortality in New York law.198 In further-
ance of such goals, there are provisions for the surveillance and
execution of an immunization program for children to protect
against communicable diseases,199 as well as testing for certain
other diseases and conditions at twenty-eight days or younger,200
and a requirement that physicians test pregnant women for
syphilis201 and hepatitis B202 upon first examination. There are also
provisions for the collection, storage, and distribution of human
breast milk, and education of the public and health care providers
regarding the availability of human breast milk.203 The State recog-
nizes the importance of breast milk to an infant’s health and sur-
vival and, accordingly, allows a mother to freely breast-feed her
baby irrespective of location and exposure of nipple.204
Other significant healthcare provisions for children in New
York State are laws regarding lead poisoning.205 Some of these pro-
visions include identifying zip codes in counties with significant
concentrations of children identified with elevated blood lead
levels and targeting children under age six living in housing areas
with the highest lead exposure risk in order to develop a primary
prevention plan, including policies, education, and community
outreach to reduce lead exposure.206 There seems to be an attempt
to cover every possible contingency concerning lead screening of
children and pregnant women,207 reporting lead exposure
levels,208 and restricting manufacture and sale of lead-painted toys
and furniture.209
The State also provides for health services coverage to eligible
children210 and expectant mothers,211 which is also in keeping with
the CRC’s right to health and health services in order to ensure
198 Id. § 2500 (requiring the commissioner to act in an advisory and supervisory
capacity in matters relating to the health of mothers and their children).
199 See id. § 613.
200 Id. § 2500-a (relating to testing for phenylketonuria, homozygous sickle cell dis-
ease, hypothyroidism, branched-chain ketonuria, galactosemia and homocystinuria);
id. § 2500-f (relating to HIV).
201 Id. § 2308.
202 Id. § 2500-e.
203 Id. § 2505.
204 N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-e (McKinney 2006).
205 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1370.
206 Id. § 1370-a(3).
207 Id. §§ 1370-c, 1370-d.
208 Id. § 1370-e.
209  Id. § 1371.
210 Id. § 2511.
211 Id. § 2520.
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that “no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such
health care services.”212 It is the eligibility criteria of the insurance
and assistance programs that raise concerns as to whether no child
is in fact deprived. A child or expectant mother who does not meet
the oftentimes rigid and confusing definitions of eligibility and
other requirements213 for federal or state assistance and cannot af-
ford private care is denied access to proper health care.
The numerous provisions relating to the promotion and pro-
tection of the child’s health are in keeping with Article 6’s recogni-
tion of every child’s inherent right to life and the active obligation
of a State Party to ensure “to the maximum extent possible” the
survival of the child. Specifically, these healthcare provisions are in
line with Article 24 of the CRC’s requirement for States Parties to
take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality214
and ensure appropriate prenatal and postnatal health care for
mothers.215
VII. EDUCATION
The CRC views education as playing an integral role in a
child’s development.216 Even before the CRC was formally
adopted, it has been recognized that education is an important as-
pect of a child’s development. For example, the Eighteenth Gen-
eral Conference of the UNESCO Recommendation Concerning
Education for International Understanding, Cooperation and
Peace and Education Relating to Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of 1974 states: “[t]he word ‘education’ implies the entire
process of social life by means of which individuals and social
groups learn to develop consciously within, and for the benefit of,
the national and international communities, the whole of their
personal capacities, attitudes, aptitudes and knowledge.”217 The
CRC does not attempt to define the details of a basic curriculum,
and nor does it indicate how much of the child’s life should be
devoted to education. It requires, however that there be a funda-
mental core minimum of free compulsory primary education for
all.218
Children in New York have access to this free and compulsory
212 CRC, supra note 2, art. 24(1).
213 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2510, 2521.
214 CRC, supra note 2, art. 24(2)(a).
215 Id. art. 24(2)(d).
216 See id. art. 29.
217 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 373.
218 CRC, supra note 2, art. 28(1)(a).
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primary education.219 Interestingly, incarcerated minors receive
compulsory education up until the age of twenty years old.220
While New York laws do not have a provision that expressly ensures
the survival and development of the child, the “maintenance and
support of a system of free common schools”221 provision in the
New York State Constitution, along with statutory compulsory edu-
cation requirements222 can, nonetheless, be construed as the state’s
active assurance of a child’s development. Provisions of New York’s
Vehicle and Traffic Law regulating vehicular speed in school
zones223 and requiring cars to stop and not overtake school
buses224 are further evidence of a legislative recognition of safe ac-
cess to schools and the desire to ensure the child’s survival by lay-
ing safeguards to protect against vehicular accidents.
Dealing with health and, by extension, life, New York law also
contains provisions that connect survival and development in the
form of comprehensive school health education programs.225 The
purpose of these provisions is in line with the CRC as it seeks to
assist public schools in “developing curricula, training staff, and ad-
dressing local health education needs of students, parents, and
staff.”226
However, because the programs referenced above are limited
to health education at the elementary school level,227 children
above the elementary school age are excluded from receiving fur-
ther health education. There may be a correlation between a lack
of health education specifically concerning safe sex practices in
high schools and the number of under-aged and unwanted
pregnancies. Those pregnancies in turn contribute to the infant
and child mortality rates.228 To fully comply with the CRC, such
programs should be extended beyond the elementary school level
to protect life and ensure child survival and development as re-
quired by Article 6 of the CRC.
One of the duties imposed upon trustees of school districts
and boards of education is the duty to purchase sites for recreation
219 N.Y. CONST. art XI, § 1.
220 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202(7).
221 Id.
222 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3205.
223 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW. § 1180(c) (McKinney 2006).
224 Id. § 1174.
225 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 804-a.
226 Id. § 804-a(1).
227 Id. § 804-a(2).
228 See generally UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 87.
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and playgrounds.229 This comports with the child’s right to leisure
and recreation set forth in Article 31 of the CRC.230 Article 31 of
the CRC recognizes the right of a child to leisure, recreation, and
culture, and relates to the child development principles embodied
in Article 6 because such free time and unsupervised play is essen-
tial to the child’s physical, social, and psychological develop-
ment.231 By providing for playgrounds, New York is ensuring that
children have playtime and, by extension, is promoting their devel-
opment. It should be noted that the New York County, General
City, and Municipal Laws also make reference to the establishment
and maintenance of playgrounds.232 However, these are optional
provisions and do not impose a legal requirement on municipali-
ties to provide playgrounds and recreation areas.233
Unfortunately, the New York Education Law does not actively
ensure a child’s right to rest and leisure that, under Article 19 of
the CRC, implies having the time and freedom to do as one
pleases.234 New York law frames the length of school sessions nega-
tively as “not less than one hundred ninety days each year, inclusive
of legal holidays that occur during the term of said school and ex-
clusive of Saturdays.”235 This cannot be construed as setting a rea-
sonable limitation on schooltime, as the phrase “not less” means
that school administrators have discretion to add more hours to
the school session. Furthermore, New York does not have a statu-
tory right to recess time.
Overall, the New York Education Law mirrors the safeguards
in Article 6 of the CRC, especially with regards to a child’s right to
development, in that it provides for free and compulsory primary
education and has established provisions for leisure and recrea-
tion. The concern, however, is how these provisions in the New
York law are implemented.
VIII. EMPLOYMENT
Article 32 of the CRC concerns child labor and relates to Arti-
cle 6 of the CRC in that it specifically refers to protecting the
child’s development.236 Article 32 of the CRC requires that chil-
229 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 1709, 1604.
230 CRC, supra note 2, art. 31.
231 Id. UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 420.
232 See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(7) (McKinney 2006).
233 Id.
234 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 417.
235 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3204(4)(a).
236 CRC, supra note 2, art. 32.
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dren be protected from performing any work that is likely to be
hazardous, to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful
to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social
development.237 It also provides for the “appropriate regulation of
the hours and conditions of employment”238 as well as “a minimum
age or minimum ages for admission to employment.”239
In contrast to the lack of limitations on school hours, New
York law takes a proactive role and actively sets limitations on work-
ing hours of minors,240 including various restrictions on employ-
ment for minors under fourteen.241 Education takes precedence
when the minor is fourteen or fifteen, since no minor at those ages
may be employed when attendance is required by the Education
Law.242 The exception is if the student presents an employment
certificate or permit issued in accordance with the Education
Law.243 There are more exceptions that allow for employment with-
out an employment certificate.244 Such employment includes:
(1) Caddy service on a golf course; (2) Service as a baby sitter
staying with and at the home of a younger child or children with
or without the presence at such home of such child’s or chil-
dren’s parents or guardians; (3) Casual employment consisting
of yard work and household chores in and about a residence or
the premises of a non-profit, non-commercial organization, not
involving the use of power-driven machinery; (4) Assisting a par-
ent, aunt, uncle, grandparent or guardian in the sale of produce
of a farm that is owned or leased by the minor’s parent, aunt,
uncle, grandparent or guardian, at a farm stand or farmer’s
market stand that is owned or leased by the minor’s parent,
aunt, uncle, grandparent or guardian, at times when school in
not in session and the minor is accompanied by the parent or
guardian or has presented the written consent of the parent or
guardian. (5) Caddie service at a bridge tournament; (6) Work
for his parents or guardians either on the home farm or at other
outdoor work not connected with or for any trade, business, or
service.245
However, under no circumstance may a minor age fourteen or fif-
237 Id. art. 32(1).
238 Id. art. 32(2)(b).
239 Id. art. 32(2)(a).
240 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 133 (McKinney 2006).
241 Id. §§ 130, 133, 134.
242 Id. § 131(1).
243 Id. § 131(2).
244 Id. § 131(3).
245 Id.
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teen work in connection with a factory.246 This prohibition of fac-
tory work extends to all children under the age of eighteen.247
Education also takes precedence over employment, as an em-
ployed minor between ages sixteen and seventeen must still attend
school.248 To ensure that the student is not deprived of rest time,
an employed minor at that age may attend school part-time.249 This
is mandatory, as the minor may not be employed while school is in
session unless he or she is enrolled part-time.250 The hours of
school instruction are delineated as “not less than four, nor more
than eight hours per week.”251 The allowable hours of work for
these part-time enrolled minors252 are up to forty-eight hours per
week,253 up to six days a week,254 and not after midnight or prior to
6:00 a.m.255
The Education and Labor Laws, taken together, promote the
development of the child, as the limitations on work and school
hours serve to ensure rest and leisure, and education provides a
vital benefit to the child. The Labor Law’s allowance of employ-
ment for up to twenty-eight hours a week for minors enrolled in
school full-time, and up to forty-eight hours a week for minors en-
rolled as part-time students, juxtaposed with the Education Law’s
restriction on a maximum of eight hours of instruction a week for
part-time employed students, illustrates the scale tipping in favor of
labor and against education. The CRC emphasizes and stresses the
importance of education. To be more in keeping with the goals
and principles of the CRC, the provisions concerning hours of em-
ployment for school-age children should make labor hours more
restrictive and should expand education hours.
IX. SOCIAL SERVICES
New York Social Services Law covers a variety of rights speci-
fied under the CRC that relate to the survival and development of
the child under Article 6. Specifically, the Social Services Law ad-
dress the child’s right to health,256 right to protection from all
246 Id. § 131(2).
247 See id. § 133(2).
248 Id. §§ 132(1), 132(2).
249 See id. § 143.
250 See id.
251 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3206(3).
252 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 143(3).
253 Id. § 143(2).
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 CRC, supra note 2, art. 24.
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forms of violence,257 and the right to an adequate standard of
living.258
Some of issues covered by New York State law include child
welfare,259 child abuse and protective services,260 teen preg-
nancy,261 abandonment,262 foster care,263 homeless housing,264 pa-
ternity proceedings,265 and assistance to victims of human
trafficking.266
Child protective services aim to:
encourage more complete reporting of suspected child abuse
and maltreatment and to establish in each county of the [S]tate
a child protective service capable of investigating such reports
swiftly and competently and capable of providing protection for
the child or children from further abuse or maltreatment and
rehabilitative services for the child or children and parents
involved.267
The interagency reporting creates an overlap between the Public
Health Law, Education Law, and the Family Law to establish the
requirements for mandatory reporting of child abuse.268 This
serves to further the goal of protecting a child from violence.
There are also provisions for “preventative services,” which re-
flect the finding of the New York State Legislature that “it is desira-
ble for children to grow up with a normal family life in a
permanent home and that such circumstance offers the best op-
portunity for children to develop and thrive.”269 Preventative ser-
vices entail:
supportive and rehabilitative services provided . . . to children
and their families for the purpose of: averting an impairment or
disruption of a family which will or could result in the place-
ment of a child in foster care; enabling a child who has been
placed in foster care to return to his family at an earlier time
than would otherwise be possible; or reducing the likelihood
that a child who has been discharged from foster care would
257 Id. art. 19.
258 Id. art. 27.
259 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 372-a, 395-398, 409.
260 Id. §§ 411–425.
261 Id. §§ 409i–n, 465.
262 Id. § 372-g.
263 Id. §§ 383-c, 398-a.
264 Id. § 43.
265 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 372-c.
266 Id. §§ 483-aa – 483-ee.
267 Id. § 411.
268 Id. § 413, N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 214-a.
269 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(1)(a)(i).
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return to such care.270
Thus, New York law in many ways already enshrines the same goals
and requirements found in Article 6 of the CRC when it provides
for social services to New York’s children.
Article 6 of the CRC concerns the child’s rights to life and
maximum survival and development.271 It goes beyond the human
rights norm of the right to not arbitrarily lose one’s life. Article 6 is
a positive right, meaning it requires States Parties to take further
steps to ensure to the maximum extent possible a child’s survival
and development, including physical mental, spiritual, moral, psy-
chological, and social development to prepare the child for
adulthood.272
Paragraph 1 of Article 6 raises no concerns when read in con-
junction with New York law since, with regards to capital punish-
ment, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Roper v. Simmons in 2005—
prohibiting capital punishment for crimes committed by persons
under age eighteen—is in keeping with Article 6’s recognition of
every child’s right to life. The Court’s ruling is also in keeping with
Article 37(a) of the CRC, which prohibits capital punishment or
life imprisonment without parole for children.273
The focus is New York law is thus primarily on child survival
and development. Though both words are always phrased together
to emphasize development as a holistic concept, the laws of New
York seem to reflect a separation of the terms and, consequently,
an imbalanced emphasis on survival over development.
Survival under New York law seems to be viewed as preventing
death. Survival measures focus on protecting a child’s life, and to
keep a child from losing her or his life as a result of poor health or
abuse. New York law has many provisions in place to protect a
child’s life, with particular focus on infant mortality. Laws that al-
low a mother to breastfeed freely anywhere, enact numerous provi-
sions for prenatal care and immunizations, require screenings and
regulations for lead exposure, and that mandate child health insur-
ance for low-income families are all steps to ensure a child’s sur-
vival. The mandatory reporting requirements under the Social
Services Law that triggers child protective services to step in and
ascertain a child’s situation at home is another step in the direction
of ensuring a child’s survival by protecting her or him from abuse
270 Id. § 409.
271 CRC, supra note 2, art. 6.
272 UNICEF IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 89, at 86.
273 CRC, supra note 2, art. 37(a).
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or neglect in the home. However, budgetary concerns may prevent
effective implementation of the Social Services Law.
In contrast, fewer laws enacted by the New York Legislature
are geared solely toward positive youth development. The concept
of development under New York law is primarily addressed
through compulsory education of children up to the age of six-
teen.274 This recognition of the importance of education is in keep-
ing with the CRC’s goals. A dedication to education does, however,
interweave with the reality of children needing to work for a variety
of reasons. Thus, the current Labor Law provisions allow for em-
ployment of up to twenty-eight hours a week for students enrolled
in school full-time.
Ironically, the compulsory education provision itself is, at
times, the root of the problem since mandatory attendance and
truancy laws often conflict. As a result, a child may be arrested or
detained for missing school, and a child missing just one day of
school can be labeled a truant. If the child habitually misses school
or is labeled “incorrigible,” she or he may have a PINS proceeding
filed against him or her. Thus, in this respect, the noble aim of
fostering development by requiring education actually results in
the opposite effect of feeding youth into the juvenile justice system,
thus reducing a child’s chances of survival.
Truancy and curfew violations are status offenses that open
the door to the juvenile justice system. As such, efforts must be
made to prevent children from entering the system. As the laws
currently stand, the child enters a system that has a view towards
punishment rather than providing aid, treatment, and rehabilita-
tion, all of which a child could receive from child protective ser-
vices. Once divorced from the family setting, children are funneled
through the juvenile justice system and not through social services.
Again, this is likely a result of the lack of effective interagency col-
laboration under the Penal and Social Services Laws, as is seen with
provisions concerning especially vulnerable children. The Legisla-
ture could correct this discrepancy by creating a coordinating body
that would bring together the agencies involved in the protection
and prosecution of children in New York State. This would ensure
that those agencies’ policies work with each other—rather than
asymmetrically, as they presently do—and that the concerns and
interests of each agency’s constituencies are discussed among all
the agencies responsible for the services and well-being of
children.
274 N.Y. CONST. art XI § 1; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202(1).
